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Abstract. The paper tries to find out the impact of trade liberalization on income inequality. 
The literature suggests that trade favors one segment of the society over other and cause 
uneven development. For example, one possible way through which inequality is suspected 
to seep into the economy through processes of liberalization is by increasing the relative 
wages of skilled labor as compared to the unskilled ones. Empirical evidence is provided to 
this effect by employing Theil Wage inequality Index and up to 28 different concepts of 
openness/ trade policy. OLS as well as 2SLS regressions with numerous specifications were 
run.  It is found out that openness not only causes wage inequality but the relationship is 
significant for the developing countries. Additionally, the study also suggests that human 
capital, which is accrued from liberalization processes, is responsible for amplifying wage 
inequality..  
Keywords. Wages, International trade, asymmetries. 
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‚Openness and trade liberalization are now seen almost universally as 
key components of the national policy cocktail required for economic 
growth and aggregate economic well being. They are believed to have 
been central to the remarkable growth of industrial countries since the 
mid- 20th century and to the examples of successful economic 
development since around 1970. The continued existence of 
widespread and abject poverty, on the other hand, represents perhaps 
the greatest failure of the contemporary global economy and the 
greatest challenge it faces as we enter the 21st century‛. Alan Winters 
(2000). 
‚Comprehensive trade reform can be helpful in reducing poverty 
provided it is accompanied by appropriate enabling policies.‛ Global 
Poverty report (World Bank, 2001a). 
 
1. Introduction 
any studies have tried to capture the relationship between trade 
liberalization and income inequality. A recent paper by the two well 
known World Bank economists, Dollar & Kraay (2004), concludes that 
liberalization does not carry any significant effects on income distribution and at 
best the relationship is of neutral nature. However their results have been 
challenged by many on the basis of their methodology and variable choice (i.e., see 
Ravallion, 2003; Amann et. al., 2002; Srinivasam & Bhagwati, 2002). Murshed 
(2003) pointed out that Dollar and Kraay only considered successful globalizers, 
mainly from Asia, in their analysis and excluded the unsuccessful globalizers from 
their sample in order to capture trade and poverty relationships. Furthermore there 
is ample empirical evidence in the literature which rejects the notion that trade is 
insignificantly related with inequality. For example, Behrman et. al., (2001) 
noticed that in 7 out of 18 Latin American countries that initiated market reforms in 
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the mid 1980s, inequality has actually increased in recent times. The rest of the 
economies in their sample showed that inequality was approximately same in 
1990s to the levels of 1980s. Jayasuriya (2002), though accepted that liberalization 
has reduced consumption poverty in South Asia, showed skepticism concerning 
neutral distributional effects of liberalization. A more clear line is adopted by 
single country case studies. Many suggest that the distribution of the positive 
effects of liberalization is some what skewed towards urban households rather than 
rural and wealthy households rather than poor. 1  It is further noticed in many 
studies2 that liberalization process in many developing countries seems to be biased 
against low-skilled labor. The empirical verification in this regard comes mainly 
from Latin American region primarily because most of the economies in the region 
undertook rigorous reform policies in the mid 1980s as part of their structural 
adjustment plans and also witnessed grappling inequality in Post reform periods. 
Ligovini et. al., (2001) found out that inequality in Mexico rose sharply between 
1984 and 1994 and rising returns to skill labor accounted for 20 percent of the 
increase in the inequality in household per capita income. Similarly, Hanson & 
Harrison (1999) found that the reduction in tariffs and the elimination in import 
licenses account for 23 percent increase in the relative wages of skilled labor over 
the period of 1986-1990 thus providing evidence for the role liberalization played 
in rising inequality in Mexico. Other country studies on Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Venezuela, also show that skilled workers received increased premiums after 
liberalization when compared to their unskilled counterparts (World Bank, 2001b). 
Such empirical evidence contradicts the basic trade theory which suggests that 
trade liberalization would result in an increase in demand for low-skilled in a 
developing country, thereby improving the relative earnings of this group 
compared with the more skilled. The evidence further feeds the fears of Ravallion 
(2003) that openness to trade can lead to the demand for relatively skilled labor, 
which tends to be more inequitably distributed in poor countries than rich ones. He  
also proposed caution regarding the results of David & Dollar (2004) paper 
concerning neutral inequality effects of trade reform on the base of latter’s 
methodology and referred to his own empirical work which found that reform 
process do carry unequal distributional effects. 
 
2. Trade liberalisation and movements in relative wages  
We employ the UTIP-UNIDO wage inequality ‘THEIL’ measure calculated by 
University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP), instead of taking measures of 
absolute inequality which captures the personal income distribution i.e. GINI. This 
is because we are more interested in the functional distribution of income. Changes 
in the functional distribution between skilled and unskilled labour, will in turn 
predictably impact on the personal income distribution in countries that are 
unskilled labour abundant. Inequality will rise as the skilled-unskilled labour wage 
premium increases and vice versa. Since, the Theil Index is based on UNIDO 2001, 
the wages of skilled and unskilled labor represent sectoral wage rates, including 
manufacturing industries for which the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database 
(UISDB) provides detailed time-series data for most countries in the world. 
The basic formula of Theil index is as follows. 
 
1 See for example, Chen & Ravallion (2003), Cockburn (2001), Friedman (2000), Lofgren (1999).  
2 i.e., Behrman et. al., (2001).  
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Whereas under perfect equality, i.e. everybody gets the mean income, the index 
takes the value equal to zero: 
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However in the case of perfect inequality, one person takes all and everyone 
else gets nothing. The individuals can be ordered in the sum from i=1,...,n from 
lowest to highest income. 
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The value of Theil index depends upon the size of the population, as in (3). For 
example, consider a society with two people where one person has everything and 
compare it to a society with four people where one person has everything, also. 
Which society is more unequal? There are more poor persons per rich person in the 
society of four people, so the Theil index will be greater in that case. The UTIP 
dataset provides the Theil index for nearly 160 developing and developed 
countries, and the time series spans 40 years, from the early 1960s to the late 
1990s.  
Figure 1 illustrates trends in wage inequality over time in selected developing 
countries and is representative of different regions. All the country graphs, except 
one, show that wage inequality has been on the rise in 1980s and 1990s. The only 
exception is Singapore which belongs to group associated with the ‚East Asian 
Miracle‛ of the 1980s. This miracle, however, is confined to a few countries, and is 
not representative of the developing world, as is evident from above graphs. Since 
1980s and 1990s are associated with ‘Structural Adjustment Policies’ under which 
many developing countries embraced liberalization, it is safe to imply that the 
above trends in wage inequality is related to these market reforms.  
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Figure 1. Structural Adjustment Policies. 
 
The object of this paper is to see whether this proposition holds across some 
124 developing countries and economies in transition. Appendix 3 lists these 
countries, and the latest year for which the Theil wage inequality index was 
available for them.  
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To this effect the paper initially proposes a simple OLS regression model: 
 
iiiii DisteqHKOPENTHEIL       (4) 
 
Where iTHEIL  is wage inequality in country i, iOPEN and iHK are 
respectively measures for openness/trade policy and human capital and i  is the 
random error term, whereas iDisteq  (distance from the equator) is a proxy for 
geography. Inclusion of human capital and geography variables will enhance the 
explanatory power of our model because on the one hand human capital plays 
important role in inequality in a post liberalization period since international trade 
favors skilled labor over unskilled and on the other hand country locations 
determine patterns of trade subsequently affecting inequality.  
 
 
Figure 2. Openness (Exports+Imports/GDP, 1985) , Tariffs (Import Duties as a % Imports, 
1985) and Wage Inequality (Theil Index, 1997). 
 
 
Before undertaking any regression analysis, let us take a look at simple graphs 
(figure 2) showing bi-variate relationship between openness and inequality. The 
first graph in the figure shows that trade shares are positively related with increases 
in inequality and confirms our hypothesis that international trade is biased towards 
the wages of skilled labor in developing countries. However interestingly, the 
second graph in figure 2 fails to develop any definite association between tariffs3 
and inequality substantiates the findings of Dollar & Kraay (2004) that the 
relationship between integration and inequality is at best insignificant. Well the 
lesson which can be drawn from figure 2 is that the choice of openness/trade policy 
variable matters apropos its relation with inequality. This calls for a robustness 
check. 
To this effect the OLS regression analysis (Appendix 1) utilizes several 
concepts of openness and trade policy in addition to trade shares and tariff rates. 
Here a study by Rose (2004) has been of great use because his paper identifies 
nearly 60 different measures of openness/trade policy. 28 of these measures, which 
suit the data requirements, are employed in this paper (Please refer to Appendix 2 
which gives detailed information about these measures). Nevertheless our core 
openness variable remains to be overall trade share (the ratio of nominal imports 
plus exports to GDP).  
As far as the signs of the coefficients of 28 openness/trade policy variables are 
concerned, Tables 1a and 1b show that they have been overwhelmingly positive 
under all specifications satisfying the assertion that openness is positively 
 
3 Movement in tariffs captures country’s trade policy and also shows its level of openness. 
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associated with increased wage inequality. However the coefficients have very 
small values suggesting limited role they play in explaining inequality. Small 2R
values with any of the specifications of Eq (4) suggest the same. Additionally only 
7 out of 28 openess/trade policy concepts have turned out to be significant which 
suggest that the relationship between trade and inequality is weak in nature. In the 
light of these results we cannot confidently claim that openness cause increased 
relative wage inequality by favoring skilled labor.  
The OLS regression though useful is always suspected to suffer from 
econometric problems such as endogeneity among variables especially under cross 
section analysis. Though Geography is a pure exogenous variable here, the level of 
integration of an economy depends upon its location in the world map (Rodrik et. 
al., 2004). Similarly, human capital depends on the fact how open a country is. 
Though simple Stolper-Samuelson theory would suggest that the returns to skill 
would decline and with them incentives for education when a skilled-scarce 
developing country opens up (see Wood & Ridao-Cano, 1999), in a 
multidimensional Stolper Simuelson model which is nearer to real life, endogenous 
growth with constant returns to R & D or skills-bias in tradables as oppose to non 
tradables could very well lead to increase in returns to education upon openness 
(Arbache et. al., 2004). Openness can also lead to more efficient education 
technologies thus improving the level of human capital in a country (Winters, 
2004). Here we have to extract the dependency of trade policy/openness on human 
capital by finding a right instrument for the former variable.  
The literature clearly establishes that predicted trade shares following Frankel & 
Romer (FR) (1999) from the gravity equation is the most appropriate instrument 
for openness/ trade policy (see, Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Rodrik et. al., 2004; 
Acemolgu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001; Hall & Jones, 1999). Furthermore, 
following the likes of Rodrik et. al., (2004), distance from the equator has been 
chosen as the second instrument for openness/trade policy variables. 
Our Instrumental Variable (IV) Regression (or 2 Stage Least Square) model has 
two equations 
 
iiii HKOPENTHEIL 1        (5) 
 
iiii DisteqFROPEN 2        (6) 
 
Here iFR  stands for predicted trade shares from gravity equations computed by 
Frankel & Romer (1999). 
In the 1st stage, equation (6) has been used to generate predicted values of 
openness/ trade policy variables by regressing them on the two instruments. The 
predicted openness/trade policy variables are then employed in equation (5) as the 
second and final stage of IV regression analysis. Please note that the only 
difference between eq (5) and equation (4) is that the former does not carry  
iDisteq  variable which is instead used as an instrument in eq (6).  
Before we carry out the IV analysis, let us look at simple bivariate graphs 
between predicted trade shares and predicted tariff rates with Theil index to see 
whether this time we can get a clearer picture regarding openness inequality 
relationship. Figure 3 visibly shows that inequality moves positively with 
openness. The predicted values of openness/trade policy provide a much clear 
trends in openness-inequality movements. On the one hand the first graph of figure 
3 shows that increase in trade shares after liberalization leads to higher inequality 
and on the other hand the second graph suggests that decrease in tariffs carries 
unequal distributional effects on wages. One of the reasons for decrease in relative 
wages of unskilled labor, as tariffs fall, is that the heavily protected sectors in many 
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developing countries tend to be the sectors that employ a high proportion of 
unskilled workers (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2004).  
 
 
Figure 3. Openness (Predicted values of ‘Exports+Imports/GDP’, 1985), Tariffs (Predicted 
values of ‘Import Duties as a % Imports’, 1985) and Wage Inequality (Theil Index, 1997). 
 
 
Table 2 (Appendix 1) gives IV regression results with 58 different 
specifications. The results confirm the findings of figure 3. All openness/ trade 
policy variables carry expected signs and nearly all of them are significantly related 
with wage inequality. Under the light of these results it can be safely suggested that 
trade liberalization significantly worsens the distribution of wages among skilled 
and unskilled labor in developing countries. Further more, human capital is 
negatively related to inequality showing that the countries which start out with 
relatively developed human capital do well apropos wage inequality. This is an 
expected result and in line with theory that the countries, where human capital is 
evenly distributed, are less prone to adverse wage distributions among labor 
(Fisher, 2001; Tuelings & Van Rens, 2002; Eiche, 2001; and Bourguignon & 
Morrisson, 1990; Tilak, 1989).  
 
3. Human capital, trade and unequal wages 
According to Tinbergen (1975) inequality is determined by the opposing effects 
that technology (skilled labor demand) and education (skilled labor supply) exerted 
on the relative wages. Following the line proposed by Tinbergen, the role of human 
capital vis-à-vis inequality becomes complex once we bring trade liberalization 
into the picture as trade effects the demand of skilled labor through technology 
transfer and processes of learning by doing. For example, human capital under 
liberalization can cause wage inequality in a developing country, where there is 
unequal distribution of skilled and unskilled labor, because global integration cause 
upward pressure on the wages of the skilled labor as demand of skilled labor 
exceeds its supply  
Recently, Eiche et. al., (2001: 19) accepted this fact and suggested that human 
capital plays a dual role in development because the stock of educated workers in 
an economy determine both the degree of income inequality and the rate of growth, 
and the parameters of the demand for and supply of labor are crucial determinants 
of whether inequality increases or decreases as an economy accumulates human 
capital. Arbache et. al., (2004) also confirms this assertion as they found out that 
imported technology has raised the relative demand for highly skilled labor in 
Brazil and thus lowered the wages of low level education groups.  
Figure 4, below shows that trade liberalization improves human capital in 
developing countries. This is true because as explained above, increased 
international trade is followed by technology transfer which in turn improves the 
general skill level in a developing country as learning by doing takes place and 
skilled labor supply tries to adjust with its excess demand. This means that part of 
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human capital is endogenous to the processes of openness as hinted by many 
endogenous growth models. Here the part of skilled human capital which is 
endogenous to integration will have its own effect on relative wages and inequality. 
And this effect is expected to be different from the one which is attributed to the 
initial human capital endowments in a country.  
 
 
Figure 4. Openness (Predicted values of ‘Exports+Imports/GDP’, 1985) and HK. 
 
We know from above discussion that wage inequality in many developing 
countries has deteriorated amid more international trade. In order to know whether 
human capital accumulation, which is directly accrued through processes of trade, 
is guilty of aggravating wage inequality in developing countries, the paper 
generates predicted values of human capital by regressing them on FR (1999) 
predicted trade shares. Figure 5 shows two graphs. First one illustrates a simple 
relation ship between human capital and wage inequality and suggests that 
countries with better human capital do well apropos inequality. The second graph, 
where we predicted human capital on FR trade shares, follows the opposite line and 
confirms that human capital accumulation which is owed to global integration, 
carry augmented effects on wage inequality. Now this leads to another question as 
to why would human capital under liberalized trade work against wage equality in 
developing countries? The answer is simple. Generally in most developing 
countries human capital is unevenly distributed (Ravallion, 2003). Thomas, Wang 
& Fan (2000) and Domenech & Castello (2002) have found out that Gini 
coefficient of the distribution of human capital in Sub Saharan Africa and South 
Asia respectively, is the highest in the world. Berthelemy (2004) came up with the 
same conclusion not only for Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia but also for 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). According to Berthelemy (2004), the 
unequal distribution of income in these regions are due to inequitable education 
policies of their respective governments who pay on average much more attention 
to secondary and tertiary education than primary education. 
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One of the reasons for this biasness in education policies in these developing 
countries towards higher education is the fact that elementary education has a very 
limited direct role in determining growth rates. According to Barro (1999) the rate 
of economic growth responds more to secondary or higher education levels rather 
than elementary schooling. This is true because processes of growth are deeply 
linked with higher education instead of primary education. For example, in 
developing countries international trade, which is one of the key determinants of 
growth, favors either highly qualified university graduates or those who have at 
least finished their high school. The sole reason that India and China have been the 
haven for international outsourcing and trade in contemporary times is because 
they have managed to accumulate relatively educated and skilled human capital by 
investing on higher education. It is expected that over the next five years, 3.3 
million services and industry jobs and $ 136 billion in wages will be outsourced 
only from United States, while most of them finding their way to the Indian or 
Chinese Shores. Only in India, on any given day in New Delhi, Bombay and 
Bangalore, the call goes for a new call center recruits who are sufficiently educated 
to communicate in English and have at least acquired a high school diploma. At 
least, as far as international trade is concerned, it is quite evident that the Southern 
countries which are benefiting today and which will benefit the most in near future 
are those who have transformed a portion of their labor force into relatively skilled 
intensive by investing generously on its higher education programs. Well, these 
countries are also the ones which have been the fastest growing economies of 
recent times. 
So it is no surprise that in order to be competitive in a race to the top, 
developing countries generally have a tendency to invest in higher education at the 
cost of primary education to achieve greater growth. Recently, Pakistan has also 
fallen for this trap as its current education policy is skewed towards higher 
education, whereas primary education is being overlooked. Only last year the 
government increased its higher education budget to Rs 5 billion from a meager 
amount of Rs 800 million five years ago - an increase of nearly 400 percent. For 
this year the government has allocated double the amount of last year for higher 
education. Such a focus on higher education is unprecedented in the history of this 
country. However allocation of funds to primary education is in contrast with such 
heavy investments in higher education since the budget for primary education has 
been increased by a meager average of 4 percent for the last few years. Though, in 
coming years Pakistan will definitely reap the fruits of its higher education focus 
and compete with other developing countries in international markets for its cheap 
and skilled human capital, it should also get ready for increased distortions in 
domestic labor markets as the relative wages of unskilled labor would decline amid 
increased international trade. This apparent pro growth higher education policy of 
Pakistan at the cost of primary education may very well be good for income 
generation but it definitely excludes the poor and unskilled and will subsequently 
lead to increased wage and income inequalities in the country.  
In order to show how income inequalities increase with education inequality 
Gregorio & Lee (1999) worked with a traditional model of human capital where 
the level of earnings (Y) is accrued by an individual with S years of schooling:  
 



s
j
jos urYY
1
)1log(loglog       (9) 
where jr is the rate of return to the jth year of schooling. The function can be 
approximated by: 
 
.loglog urSYY os                    (10) 
 
Where as the distribution of earnings can be written as: 
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A sharp rise in educational inequalities Var(S) would unambiguously lead to 
higher wage inequality in equation (11) if other variables are held constant. On the 
same account, rise in wage inequality is a clear outcome if Var(r) is high. Here we 
know that returns to higher education are greater than returns to primary education 
in developing countries because of excess demand of skilled labor as rapid 
technology diffusion amid trade liberalization takes place and skilled labor supply 
lags behind.  
However, equation (11) also suggests that under the assumption of other things 
as constant, if the covariance between the return to education and the level of 
education is negative, an increase in schooling can reduce wage inequality. Well 
there is some empirical evidence that there is a negative relationship between the 
return to education and average years of schooling (Teulings & Van Rens, 2002). 
The negative value of Cov (r, S) suggest that as the relative supply of high skilled 
workers go up and that of unskilled workers go down, the relative wages of skilled 
labor decreases. Though Cov(r, S) gives some useful information apropos wage 
inequality, the information can very well be misleading because movements in 
relative wages are as much a function of ‘skilled labor demand’ as it is of skilled 
labor supply. For example, through trade liberalization, there is a constant transfer 
of technology in developing countries which increase the demand for skilled labor 
as learning by doing takes place. If this increased demand for skilled labor is more 
than its supply, there is a good possibility that wages of skilled labor rise instead of 
plummeting. And if the wages of unskilled labor fail to rise simultaneously because 
unskilled labor are in excess supply in developing countries, the wage inequality 
will very well increase and the negative relationship between level of schooling 
and returns to education Cov (r, S) might not hold at all. This fact is recognized by 
Dur & Tuelings (2002) when they admitted that in the Tinbergen’s (1975) famous 
race between technology (skilled labor demand) and education (skilled labor 
supply), technology has been a clear winner of recent times.  
In short the key to equality of relative wages in developing countries do not lie 
as much in Cov (r, S) but in the value of Var(S). Our discussion suggests that the 
inequalities, which we witness today in developing countries, have two important 
determinants. First there are significant inequalities in educational attainments. 
Second, the processes of international trade transform these education inequalities 
into wage inequalities by favoring the skilled labor.  
Well to this effect, in order to solve for wage inequality in developing countries, 
the respective governments need to increase the mean level of human capital 
through a balanced education policy whereby primary education is given as much 
importance as higher education. An equitable education policy will not only 
decrease Var(S), it will also lead to a negative value of Cov(r, S) as the overall 
supply of low skilled and uneducated workers go down and supply of educated 
work force increases. Dur & Tuelings (2002) have called for subsidies to all levels 
of education as they argue that the mean level of education gives rise to general 
equilibrium effects that reduce wage inequality.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The paper has found out that contrary to the claims of neo-classical paradigm, 
openness does have significant effects on wage inequality. The empirical evidence 
provided in the paper supports the argument that international trade is biased 
towards skilled workers in developing countries and with an increase of trade after 
liberalization, the wages of skilled workers are most likely to increase in South, 
where as poor who are largely unskilled shall increasingly become the hostage of 
such process.  
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This conclusion has some serious implications for the success of poverty 
reduction strategies in developing countries because inequality is one of the two 
channels through which poverty is affected. The newly adopted common wisdom 
that growth always trickles down to decrease poverty if supplemented by certain 
relevant development strategies e.g. micro finance schemes etc may be true but 
ignoring the inequality part vis-a-vis poverty is a fatal mistake especially when pro 
poor growth policies e.g. liberalization or opening up leads to increases in the 
formal variable (inequality). The general perception among the right that inequality 
is never that significant to offset pro poor growth effects is not true and has to be 
re-evaluated also.  
Recently, the World Bank has accepted this fact since its webpage 4  on 
‚Poverty‛ advices policy makers that poverty reduction and social development 
cannot be achieved by focusing on growth strategies with out any understanding of 
their effects on the distribution of income and wealth: ‚The benefits of growth for 
the poor may be eroded if the distribution of income worsens. But policies that 
promote better income distribution are not well understood; learning more about 
the impact of policies on distribution should be high on the agenda‛. 
All in all, it is apposite to conclude that more and more people might be able to 
live above poverty line with increases in growth attributed to the so-called reform 
process - thus showing some improvements regarding extreme poverty, but if 
inequality is on rise more and more people are worse off and an increase of the gap 
between have and have nots can not be defended with any academic jargon and is 
definite welfare loss. Thus it becomes all more important to understand inequality 
and its determinants. If free trade is guilty of increasing inequality among people or 
societies, the process has to be sterilized against such a phenomenon.   
The paper makes some suggestions to this effect. It tries to find those channels 
through which liberalization causes wage inequality. In line with previous studies 
we have found out that education is the key to explain the increasing gap in relative 
wages. Though the paper supports the argument that those countries which starts 
out with higher level of human capital do well on inequality front, it also suggests 
that human capital which is accrued through the liberalization process is guilty of 
unequal distribution of wages among skilled and unskilled labor. One explanation 
is that governments in the developing countries invest in higher education at the 
cost of primary education in order to accrue quicker benefits from processes of 
growth and thus become prone to wage inequality after trade liberalisation.  
The paper carries very important guide lines for policy makers. In order to 
neutralize the unequal effects of trade, the focus of policy makers should be on 
education. The countries, which have greater frequency of educated people, are in a 
better position to benefit from international trade. However there is a caveat. 
Generally the governments in developing countries tend to focus their education 
policy on higher education in the anticipation that investments in higher education 
would accrue faster dividends by exploiting the international business environment. 
Though they are right, they need to realize that they should not promote higher 
education at the cost of primary education. Since literature suggests that many 
developing countries are guilty of promoting higher education at the cost of 
primary education, only a limited segment of the society participates in activities 
emanating from international trade, whereas the majority which is excluded is also 
be barred from the benefits of growth and its processes (i.e., trade) at least in the 
short term. The cases in point are China and India who have been the most 
prominent beneficiaries of international trade. Though, both the countries are able 
to achieve high growth rates as their relatively skilled and cheaper human capital (a 
direct outcome of their higher education focus) has utilized the recent surge of 
international outsourcing by multinationals, they have suffered from increasing 
inequality because large portions of the population are left out because they were 
illiterate and unskilled.  
 
4 Web address: [Retrieved from].  
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Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1a: OLS Regression Results with different Specifications^ 
Theil Indx    1                     2                     3                     4 Theil Indx      1                    2                  3                    4 
lcopen 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
  0.04             0.035                0.003              0.03 
  (2.58)*         (2.6)*               (1.8)**         (1.82)*** 
-0.009           -0.008 
(-2.1)**         (-2.1)** 
  0.0002                                0.0002 
 (0.35)                                   (0.23) 
   70                 70                    114                 114 
   0.11             0.11                  0.03                0.02 
Impen2a 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.0003         -0.0003         -0.001            -0.001 
(-0.15)            (-0.12)          (-0.5)            (-0.49) 
-0.003             -0.004 
(-0.7)               (-0.8) 
-0.0002                               -0.0003 
(-0.3)                                   (-0.34) 
58                        58                 72                72 
0.01                    0.01             0.005            0.0035 
impen1o 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
m  
R2 
0.0004         0.0004             0.0001               0.0001 
(0.8)             (0.95)              (0.28)                (0.27) 
-0.005          -0.005           
(-0.9)            (-1.13) 
-0.0003                               -0.0005 
(-0.4)                                   (-0.59) 
  59                 59                     73                    73 
 0.03              0.02                 0.006               0.001 
Impen2r 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
0.002                0.002          0.0015            0.001 
(2.6)*              (2.67)*          (1.5)              (1.5) 
-0.007            -0.007 
(-1.5)               (-1.5) 
0.00009                               -0.0003 
(0.1)                                      (-0.3) 
58                        58                 72                 72 
0.12                     0.12              0.03             0.03 
impen1m 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
  n 
R2 
0.0009           0.001             0.0005               0.0005 
(1.2)              (1.34)             (0.69)                (0.71) 
-0.005          -0.006 
(-1.1)             (-1.3) 
-0.0003                              -0.0005  
(-0.3)                                   (-0.6) 
59                     59                  73                      73  
0.04                 0.04              0.011                 0.007 
Tars1o 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
0.0005              0.0005         0.0005          0.0005 
(1.8)***            (1.9)***       (1.7)***     (1.7)*** 
-0.007               -0.007 
(-1.39)                (-1.5) 
-0.0001                                 -0.0004 
(-0.04)                                    ( 0.4) 
59                           59               73                 73 
0.07                      0.07             0.04             0.04 
Impen1a 
 
Hk 
 
disteq 
 
  n 
R2 
0.001             0.001          0.00001            -0.00001 
(0.46)            (0.48)           (0.01)               (0.001) 
-0.003          -0.004          -0.0005 
(-0.71)           (-0.9)            (-0.6) 
-0.003 
(-0.71) 
  59                   59                 73                     73 
 0.02                 0.01             0.18                 0.0000 
Tars1m 
 
Hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.001               0.0002          0.0001          -0.0001 
(-0.27)              (0.36)          (-0.17)            (-0.18) 
-0.004              -0.005 
(-0.73)             (-0.36) 
-0.0004                                 -0.0005 
(-0.48)                                   (-0.59) 
59                         59                  73                 73 
0.02                    0.015            0.005            0.0005 
Impen1r 
 
Hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
0.0003           0.0002         -0.0007              -0.0007 
(0.02)             (0.09)           (-0.45)               (-0.5) 
-0.0033          -0.004     
(-0.65)            (-0.9) 
-0.0005                              -0.0005 
(-0.5)                                   (-0.6) 
 59                     59                 73                      73 
 0.02                 0.01             0.007                 0.003 
Tars1a 
 
Hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.0008           -0.0004        -0.0009         -0.0006 
(-0.5)                (-0.29)           (-0.7)             (-0.5) 
-0.003               -0.004 
(-0.6)                  (-0.9) 
-0.0007                                 -0.0007 
(-0.7)                                       (-0.8) 
59                           59                73                   73 
0.02                      0.43               0.01             0.003 
Impen2o 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
0.0004           0.0005           0.0003                0.0003 
(1.3)               (1.3)              (0.7)                  (0.75) 
-0.006            -0.005  
(-1.1)             (-1.19) 
0.00001                               -0.0002 
(0.01)                                    (-0.3) 
58                     58                    72                     72 
0.04                 0.04                 0.009                0.008 
Tars1r 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
0.002                  0.003           0.003               0.003 
(4.8)*                  (4.9)*         (5.2)*              (5.3)* 
-0.009                -0.01 
(-2.2)**               (2.3)** 
0.0002                                   -0.0004 
(0.35)                                      (-0.6) 
59                            59              73                    73 
0.31                        0.31            0.28               0.28 
Impen2m 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
  
n 
R2 
0.0002              0.0003           0.0002              0.0002 
(0.4)                  (0.46)            (0.31)               (0.35) 
-0.004               -0.004 
(-0.81)              (-0.94) 
-0.001                                   -0.0002 
(-0.81)                                    (-0.29)  
58                         58                 72                    72 
0.01                     0.01              0.003              0.001 
Tars2o 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
  
n 
R2 
0.0003               0.0003         0.00006        0.00006 
(1.3)                   (1.4)           (0.61)             (0.6) 
-0.006                -0.006        
(-1.2)                   (-1.3) 
0.0001                                    -0.0007 
(0.1)                                         (-0.8) 
57                             57               70                  70 
0.04                        0.05             0.01             0.005 
Notes: -*, ** and *** denotes 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. ^ For variable descriptions 
please refer to appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkish Economic Review 
TER, 5(1), D. Mamoon,  p.65-82. 
77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1b: OLS Regression Results with different Specifications^ 
Theil Indx    1                      2                      3                     4 Theil Indx      1                     2                     3                    4 
Tars2m 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.0001           -0.00006          -0.0001            -0.0001 
(-0.21)              (-0.13)             (-0.3)               (-0.27) 
-0.003                -0.003 
(-0.54)               (-0.71) 
-0.0003                                      -0.001 
(-0.34)                                       (-0.77) 
57                           57                   70                  70 
0.01                       0.01                0.009              0.05 
totgvm 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.0006          -0.0006          -0.0009        -0.0009 
(-1.3)               (-1.4)           (-1.9)***       (-1.9)** 
-0.005             -0.006 
(-1.00)             (-1.2) 
-0.0003                                 -0.0004  
(-0.37)                                     (-0.5) 
 55                       55                  70                  70 
0.05                     0.05              0.05               0.05 
Tars2a 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.002               -0.001           -0.0007             -0.0005 
(-1.3)                (-1.14)             (-0.8)               (-0.62) 
-0.002               -0.003           -0.0008         
(-0.47)              (-0.77)             (-0.9) 
-0.0008         
(-0.8) 
 57                        57                  70                      70 
0.04                     0.04                0.02                 0.005 
totgva 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.0008          -0.0009           -0.001            -0.001 
(-1.8)***       (-1.91)***      (-2.4)**        (2.38)** 
-0.006             -0.006              
(-1.16)            (-1.31) 
-0.0003                                 -0.0006  
(-0.39)                                  (-0.66) 
55                       55                   70                70 
0.08                   0.07               0.08            0.076 
Tars2r 
 
Hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
0.0017                0.0017             0.0002           0.0002 
(3.8)*                  (3.9)*              (1.19)            (1.13) 
-0.008                 -0.008 
(-1.9)***             (-1.9)*** 
0.0003                                         -0.0007 
(0.34)                                           (-0.86) 
57                           57                    70                  70 
0.228                     0.227                0.029          0.018 
totgvr 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
   
n 
R2 
-0.0002           -0.003           -0.0005          -0.0006 
(-0.48)            (-0.52)           (-1.02)            (-1.04) 
-0.004            -0.0045           
(-0.74)           (-0.91)           
-0.0005                                 -0.0006 
(-0.55)                                   (-0.65) 
55                      55                    70                 70 
0.02                0.018                0.022            0.015 
tariffs 
 
Hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.0015              -0.0015         -0.0006            -0.0007 
(-1.2)                   (-1.2)             (-0.4)                (-0.5) 
-0.008                 -0.008             
(-1.5)                   (-1.6) 
-0.0001                                      0.0003 
(-0.1)                                          (0.4) 
59                          59                    82                    82 
0.05                       0.05               0.005              0.003 
owqi 
 
Hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.038             -0.04            -0.049               -0.052 
(-1.03)             (-1.1)            (-1.4)                 (-1.5) 
-0.005             -0.005         
(-1.1)               (-1.2)           
-0.0002                                -0.0005 
(-0.28)                                  (-0.66) 
   59                    59                  72                     72 
 0.04                  0.04               0.03                  0.02 
owti 
 
Hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.053             -0.055               -0.075             -0.077 
(-0.9)                (-1.0)               (-1.4)                (-1.4) 
-0.005             -0.005         
(-1.13)              (-1.2)           
-0.0003                                   -0.0006 
(-1.13)                                      (-0.8) 
59                      59                      72                    72 
0.04                   0.03                 0.03                0.027 
nontaro 
 
Hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.0003         -0.0003         -0.0003            -0.0003 
(-0.8)             (-0.9)             (-1.1)               (-1.05) 
-0.004            -0.005 
(-0.9)              (-1.1) 
-0.0004                               -0.0007 
(-0.5)                                    (-0.7) 
  55                    55                  70                      70 
 0.03                 0.03               0.02                  0.01 
txtrg 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
0.096                0.089               0.19                0.165 
(0.19)              (0.18)              (0.48)              (0.43) 
-0.002              -0.002         
(-0.26)             (-0.29) 
0.0006                                    0.0005 
(0.51)                                     (0.54) 
40                         40                46                     36 
0.01                    0.006             0.01                 0.005 
nontarm 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
 
n 
R2 
-0.0002          -0.0002            -0.0002        -0.0002 
(-0.68)             (-0.76)             (-0.89)         (-0.88) 
-0.0004           -0.005             
(-0.49)             (-1.02) 
-0.004                                     -0.0006 
(-0.49)                                      (-0.7) 
55                       55                     70                 70 
0.03                   0.024               0.018            0.011 
totgvo 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
  
n 
R2 
-0.0006           -0.0006             -0.0009           -0.0009 
(-1.3)               (-1.42)              (-1.8)**          (-1.94) 
-0.005            -0.0058      
(-1.0)                (-1.15) 
-0.0003                                  -0.0005 
(-0.37)                                     (-0.53) 
  55                        55                  70                   70 
 0.05                     0.05               0.05                0.05 
nontara 
 
hk 
 
disteq 
  
n 
R2 
-0.0002           -0.0002         -0.0003          -0.0003 
(-0.8)               (-0.85)           (-1.09)           (-1.06) 
-0.004              -0.005            
(-0.8)               (-1.03)            
-0.0005                                  -0.0007 
(-0.5)                                       (-0.74) 
55                       55                   70                  70 
0.03                  0.027                0.024            0.016 
Notes: *, ** and *** denotes 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. ^ For variable descriptions 
please refer to appendix 1. 
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Table  2a. IV Regression Results With Different Specifications^ 
     1       2  1 2  1 2 
lcopen 0.037 0.027 impen2m 0.002 0.003 tars1r 0.003 0.004 
 (2.25)* (1.14)  (1.7)** (2.2)*  (2.4)* (2.8)* 
hk -0.008  hk -0.007  hk -0.009  
 (-2.12)*   (1.4)   (-2.14)*  
F-test 3.5* 1.3 F-test 1.8 4.9* F-test 3.4* 8.2* 
 n  70 100  n 58  72  n 59 73 
R2  0.11 0.04 R2 _ _ R2 0.30 0.23 
impen1o 0.0014 0.002 impen2a 0.007 0.01 tars2o 0.001 0.0004 
 (2.0)* (2.2)*  (1.7)** (2.1)*  (1.7)* (1.5) 
hk -0.008  hk -0.006  hk -0.008  
 (-1.65)**   (-1.2)   (-1.6)  
F-test 2.3** 5.1* F-test 1.7 4.5* F-test 1.8 2.2 
 n 59 73  n 58 72  n 57 70 
R2 _ _ R2 _ _ R2 _ _ 
impen1m 0.002 0.003 impen2r 0.003 0.005 tars2m 0.001 0.001 
 (2.1)* (2.3)*  (1.9)** (2.2)*  (1.6) (1.5) 
hk -0.009  hk -0.008  hk -0.009  
 (-1.7)**   (-1.7)**   (-1.5)  
F-test 2.4** 4.9* F-test 2.2 4.5* F-test 1.6 2.4 
 n 59 73  n 58 72  n 57 70 
R2 _ _ R2  0.1 _ R2 _ _ 
impen1a 0.007 0.01 tars1o 0.001 0.0012 tars2a 0.003 0.003 
 (1.91)** (2.2)*  (2.1)* (2.8)*  (1.39) (1.7)** 
hk -0.005  hk -0.009  hk -0.004  
 (-0.9)   (-1.8)**   (0.87)  
F-test 2.2 4.9* F-test 2.5* 6.16* F-test 1.2 2.8** 
 N 59 73  n 59 73  n 57 70 
R2 _  R2 0.03 _ R2 _ _ 
impen1r 0.009 0.009 tars1m 0.002 0.002 tars2r 0.002 0.001 
 (1.7)** (1.9)**  (1.9)** (2.1)*  (1.96)* (1.2) 
hk -0.012  hk -0.012  hk -0.009  
 (-1.6)**   (-1.8)**   (1.85)**  
F-test 1.7 3.6** F-test 2.09 4.5* F-test 2.3** 1.5 
 n 59 73  n 59 73  n 57 70 
R2 _  R2 _ _ R2 0.21 _ 
impen2o 0.001 0.002 tars1a 0.005 0.005 tariffs -0.005 -0.016 
 (1.8)** (2.3)*  (1.7)** (2.1)*  (-0.72) (-1.1) 
hk -0.007  hk -0.003  hk -0.014  
 (-1.5)   (-0.5)   (-1.12)  
F-test 1.9 5.1* F-test 1.7 4.31* F-test 0.92 1.38 
 n 58 72  n 59 73  n 59 78 
R2 0.006 _ R2 _ _ R2 _ _ 
Notes: * and ** denote significance at 5% and 10% level. ^ For variable descriptions please refer to appendix 1. 
 
Table  2b: IV Regression Results With Different Specifications^ 
 1 2  1 2 
owti -0.31 -0.26 totgvr -0.004 -0.004 
 (-234)* (-1.7)**  (-1.7)** (-2.1)* 
hk -0.004  hk -0.008  
 (-1.56)   (-1.2)  
F-test 3.3* 3.4* F-test 1.7 4.4* 
 n 73 109  n 55 70 
R2 0.08 0.01 R2 _ _ 
txtrg 3.34 3.05 owqi -0.23 -0.39 
 (1.40) (1.38)  (-0.88) (-1.3) 
hk 0.014  hk -0.008  
 (0.74)   (-1.3)  
F-test 2.2 3.9 F-test 0.8 1.5 
 n 49 66  n 59 72 
R2 _ _ R2 _ _ 
totgvo -0.002 -0.002 nontaro -0.002 -0.002 
 (2.1)** (-2.5)**  (-1.6)** (2.1)* 
hk -0.009  hk -0.013  
 (-1.5)   (-1.5)  
F-test 2.6*** 6.6* F-test 1.6 4.5* 
 n 55 70  n 55 70 
R2 _ _ R2 _ _ 
totgvm 0.002 -0.002 nontarm -0.002 -0.002 
 (-2.1)* (-2.6)*  (-1.6) (2.02)* 
hk -0.009  hk -0.015  
 (-1.5)   (-1.5)  
F-test 2.6** 6.6* F-test 1.42 4.1* 
 n 55 70  n 55 70 
R2 _ _ R2 _ _ 
totgva -0.002 -0.002 nontara -0.003 -0.002 
 (-2.2)* (-2.6)*  (-1.2) (-1.9)** 
hk -0.009  hk -0.018  
 (-1.7)**   (-1.3)  
F-test 2.7** 6.8* F-test 0.9 3.5** 
 n 55 70  n 55 70 
R2 _ _ R2 _ _ 
Notes: * and ** denote significance at 5% and 10% level. ^ For variable descriptions please refer to appendix 1. 
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Appendix 2. 
 
Data and Sources 
Black: Black Market Premium, Year: 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Disteq: Distance from Equator of capital city measured as abs (Latitude)/90. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & 
Trebbi (2002) 
heritage: Heritage Foundation Index, Source: Rose (2002). 
hk:  Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1999. Source: Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
[Retrieved from].  
hyr: Average Years of Higher Schooling in the Total Population at 25, Year: 1999.   
Source: Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, [Retrieved from].  
Impen1o: Import Penetration: overall, 1985.  Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen1m: Import penetration: Manufacturing, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen1a:  Import Penetration:  Agriculture, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen1r: Import Penetration: Resources, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen2o: Import Penetration: overall, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen2m: Import penetration: Manufacturing, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen2a: :  Import Penetration:  Agriculture, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen2r: Import Penetration: Resources, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
Lcopen: Natural logarithm of openness. Openness is given by the ratio of (nomnal) imports plus exports to GDP 
(in nominal US dollars), Year: 1985. Source: Penn World Tables, Mark 6. 
Logfrankrom: Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed following Frankel and Romer (1999) from a 
bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ variables. Source: Frankel and Romer (1999). 
Nontaro: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: Overall, 1987. Source: Rose (2002). 
Nontarm: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: manufacturing, 1987. Source: Rose (2002). 
Nontara: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: agriculture, 1987. Source: Rose (2002). 
Nontarr: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: resources, 1987. Source: Rose (2002). 
Open80: Sachs and Warners (1995) composite openness index. Source: Rose (2002). 
Owqi: Non Trade barriers Frequency on intermediate inputs, Capital goods, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Owti:  Tariffs on Intermediate and Capital Goods, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
Tars1o:  TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Tars1m: TARS Trade Penetration: manufacturing, 1985. Source:  Rose (2002). 
Tars1a: TARS Trade Penetration: agriculture, 1985. Source:  Rose (2002). 
Tars1r: TARS Trade Penetration: resources, 1985. Source:  Rose (2002). 
Tars2o: TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1982. Source:  Rose (2002). 
Tars2m: TARS Trade Penetration: manufacturing, 1982. Source:  Rose (2002). 
Tars2a: TARS Trade Penetration: agriculture, 1982. Rose (2002). 
Tars2r: TARS Trade Penetration: resourses, 1982. Rose (2002). 
Tariffs: Import Duties as percentage imports, Year:1985. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), 2002. 
Theil97: UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure - calculated based on UNIDO2001 by UTIP, Year: 
1997. Source: University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) http://utip.gov.utexas.edu. 
Totgvo:  Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
Totgvm: Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: manufacturing, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
Totgva: Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: agriculture, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
Totgvr: Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: resourses, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
Txtrg: Trade taxes / trade, 1982. Source: rose (2002) 
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Appendix 3. 
 
List of Countries 
Afghanistan  (1988)              
Albania   (1997)                      
Algeria  (1997) 
Angola (1993)                      
Argentina (1996)                   
Armenia (1997)                    
Azerbaijan (1994)                  
Bahamas, The (1990)                       
Bahrain  (1992)                     
Bangladesh (1990)                 
Barbados (1997)                        
Belize (1992)                                
Benin (1981)                         
Bhutan (1989)                       
Bolivia (1997)                        
Bosnia  (1990)                   
Botswana  (1997)                   
Brazil (1994)                      
Bulgaria (1997)                  
Burkina Faso (1981)                       
Burundi (1990)                       
Cameroon (1997)               
Cape Verde (1993)                 
Central African Republic 
(1993)                                
Chile (1997)                         
China  (1985)                        
Colombia  (1997) 
 Congo, Rep. (1988)                 
Costa Rica  (1997)                
Cote d'Ivoire (1997)                    
Croatia  (1994)                          
Cuba (1988)                            
Cyprus (1997)                  
Dominican Republic (1985) 
Ecuador (1997) 
Egypt,  (1997)                     
El Salvador (1997)              
Equatorial Guinea    (1990)              
Eritrea (1988)                       
Ethiopia  (1997)                              
Fiji (1997)                                  
Gabon (1994)                       
Gambia, The  (1981)                                               
Ghana   (1995)                   
Guatemala  (1997)                      
Haiti  (1988)                            
Honduras (1994)                     
Hong Kong, China (1997)              
India  (1997) 
Indonesia  (1997)                       
Iran, Islamic Rep (1993)                   
Iraq (1985) 
Jamaica (1990)                        
Jordan (1997)                
Kenya  (1997)             
Korea, Rep.  (1997)                      
Kuwait (1997)               
Kyrgyz Republic (1994)                   
Latvia   (1997)                     
Lesotho  (1994)                         
Liberia  (1985)                        
Libya (1980)                           
Lithuania  (1997)         
Macao, China  (1997)               
Macedonia, FYR (1996)      
Madagascar (1988)                
Malawi (1997)                     
Malaysia  (1997)               
Mauritania (1978)                    
Mauritius (1997) 
Mexico (1997)                      
Moldova (1994)                      
Mongolia (1994)                       
Morocco (1997)                    
Mozambique (1994)                
Myanmar (1997)                       
Namibia (1994) 
Nepal  (1996)                     
Nicaragua (1985)                        
Nigeria (1994)                           
Oman (1997)           
Pakistan  (1996)                    
Panama  (1997)                    
Papua New Guinea (1989)                     
Paraguay (1991)  
 Peru (1994)                   
Philippines  (1997)                             
Puerto Rico (1997)                     
Qatar (1994)  
Romania (1994)                 
Rwanda (1985)                                         
Saudi Arabia (1989) 
Senegal (1997)                    
Seychelles (1988)                   
Singapore (1997)              
Slovak Republic (1997) 
 Slovenia (1997)                    
Somalia (1986)                
South Africa (1997)                                                    
Sri Lanka (1994)                    
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
(1994)                          
Sudan (1972)                      
Suriname (1993) 
Swaziland ((1994) 
Syria (1997) 
Togo (1981) 
Thailand (1994) 
Tonga (1994) 
Trinidad and Tobago (1994) 
Tunisia (1997) 
Turkey (1997) 
Taiwan (1997) 
Tanzania (1990) 
Uganda(1988) 
Ukraine (1997) 
United Arab Emirates (1985) 
Ukraine (1997) 
Uruguay(1997) 
Venezuela (1994) 
Western Samoa (1972) 
Yemen (1986) 
Yoguslavia (1997) 
Zambia (1994) 
Zimbabwe (1997) 
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